Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Objects of thought, philosophy: it is advocated by some authors that beliefs or thoughts must correspond to objects. Other authors see this as the risk of an objectification or reification. When several speakers refer on their inner object there is the problem of whether it is the same or not. For example, do they have the same wish?
See also relation-theory, truthmakers, mentalism, reification._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Peter Gärdenfors on Objects of Thought - Dictionary of Arguments
I 110 Object of thought/intentional identity/Gärdenfors: example by Peter Geach (1967)(1): the three farmers Cob, Hob and Nob believe that a witch is bothering them, and they wonder if she is the same witch who has done different things. Problem: since there is no witch, there is only one object of thought. Question: is it the same object that the three farmers think of? See also Edelberg (2006) (2) and Jacot (2012)(3). Prototype/Jacot/Gärdenfors: "a witch" is under-determined. Solution: Prototypes. --- I 111 Fixed point/Gärdenfors: is reached, if e.g. one refers to the with with index words and pronomina. However, this fixed point is fragile, which becomes apparent when additional properties are added that are possibly incompatible. Solution: if there is a "meeting of minds", the same conclusions should be drawn. --- I 112 Gärdenfors: such a theory can be called sociocognitive. 1. Geach, P. (1967). Intentional identity. Journal of Philosophy, 64, 627–632. 2. Edelberg, W. (2006). Intrasubjective intentional identity. Journal of Philosophy, 103, 481–502. 3. Jacot, J. (2012). Do we speak of the same witch? How minds can meet on intentional identity. Lund: Department of Philosophy, Lund University._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
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> Counter arguments against Gärdenfors
> Counter arguments in relation to Objects of Thought
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27